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1. Introduction 
 
There is growing concern among economists and policymakers that many individuals have 
insufficient savings for retirement (Munnell et al., 2012; Crawford and O’Dea, 2012; 
Benartzi and Thaler, 2013). Two trends make this concern pressing. First, rapidly expanding 
life expectancies mean absolute levels of savings must be greater to sustain lifestyles in 
retirement. Second, the shift from defined benefit (DB) pensions to defined contribution (DC) 
pensions combined with widespread scaling back of state pension entitlements (OECD, 2015) 
transfers much responsibility for retirement planning from professionals and institutions to 
individuals (Baldwin, 2008; Poterba et al, 2007; Broadbent et al, 2006). 
 
This transfer of responsibility is unproblematic if individuals have the wherewithal to make 
good retirement planning decisions, benefitting from available subsidies and investment 
returns in a manner that maintains income and smooths spending over the life span. 
Unfortunately, evidence from behavioural economics questions whether individuals have 
such decision-making capacity. Despite the fact that it is a financial choice with potentially 
large consequences, the decision over whether and how much to save for retirement, and in 
what form, can be easily and substantially altered by how pension choices are presented (e.g., 
Madrian and Shea, 2001; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004; Iyengar and Kamenica, 2010). With 
respect to coverage, younger workers may not start a pension because of lack of knowledge 
or myopia (Foster, 2017). Statistics suggest the number of young workers with a pension is 
declining in many countries.1 Several countries have followed the lead of New Zealand in 
implementing auto-enrolment, though its appropriateness as a policy instrument is debated, 
since default contribution rates may be insufficient (O’Dea, 2015). Those who do take out a 
                                                 
1 In Ireland, the number of 25-34 year olds in employment with a pension fell from 49% in 2009 to 36% in 2015 
(CSO, 2015). Similarly, in Britain the savings rate fell from 43% to 31% for those aged 20-40 between 2001 and 
2011  (ONS, 2011). 
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pension may find it difficult to decide on an appropriate contribution rate  (Banks and 
Oldfield, 2007). Pensions are complex products involving multiple subsidies, a trade-off 
between present and future income, and essential financial concepts such as interest 
compounding, inflation and diversification. Less than one-third of young American adults 
understand these concepts (Lusardi, Mitchell and Curto, 2010), while the least financially 
literate are also least likely to save for retirement (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007). Complexity 
and comprehension may, therefore, turn out to be central issues in the retirement savings 
problem. 
 
The present study focuses on one potential method by which pensions might be simplified 
and comprehension improved. Based on previous work in educational psychology, we set out 
to test the influence of explanatory diagrams. As described below, diagrams have been shown 
to promote learning in other domains where decision makers are faced with comparative 
complexity.  In collaboration with Ireland’s regulator, the Pensions Authority, we conducted 
an incentivised laboratory experiment in which we manipulated the presence or absence of 
two diagrams on a Pension Benefit Statement (PBS), comparing outcomes against 
conventional tables and text. The annual PBS summarises the current financial position of a 
member’s account. Because it is the most regular and salient form of information disclosure 
that pension scheme members receive, its content and format have drawn the attention of 
policymakers. Recent EU legislation revised the guidelines for the PBS with the intention to 
“provide clear and adequate information to prospective members, members and beneficiaries 
to support their decision-making about their retirement” (Directive (EU) 2016/2341, recital 
46). The experiment we describe tested how the format of the PBS influences recall, 
understanding and decisions about contributions. The work therefore represents an example 
of empirically informed regulation (Sunstein, 2011). 
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We designed and tested two diagrams. The first depicted the three components of the annual 
total contribution (employee contribution from take home pay, employer match, tax relief). 
The second showed how different contribution levels related to projected fund sizes and 
monthly pensions at retirement. The presence of these diagrams was randomly manipulated 
across PBS statements assigned to a representative sample of working-age individuals. We 
tested whether the explanatory diagrams improved scores on incentivised recall and 
comprehension questions, then whether they affected decisions about contribution levels and 
the rationales participants gave for their decisions. 
 
The results indicated no clear and consistent influence on explicit recall or comprehension. 
Positive effects recorded for a subset of questions were marginal. Nevertheless, the 
explanatory diagrams did influence decision-making. Participants who saw the graphic 
depicting projected fund sizes were more inclined to propose raising the contribution level. 
Both diagrams influenced the reasons participants gave for their decision, increasing the 
likelihood that they cited the financial mechanism that each graphic depicted. The primary 
contribution of the paper, therefore, is to demonstrate that diagrams designed to explain how 
pensions work can support decision-making by facilitating relevant causal inferences.  
 
The paper makes two further contributions. First, our results go beyond existing survey 
evidence in revealing not just limited comprehension of pensions, but continued problems in 
understanding among individuals who pay attention to and read documentation. In the 
experiment, a representative sample of adults was incentivised to read and absorb typical 
information available to scheme members, presented in the simplest and clearest form we 
could develop. Yet comprehension remained disconcertingly poor. In particular, we found 
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very limited understanding of tax relief and matching contributions, with implications for 
their effectiveness as incentives. Second, the empirical results are of potential use for the 
broader provision of information, both regarding pensions and other financial products. The 
kind of diagrams we designed and tested may be helpful in multiple types of advice, 
marketing material and disclosures. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews relevant literature and motivates our 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the experiment and its results. Section 4 concludes and 
discusses implications. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 
2.1 How Well Do People Understand Their Pensions? 
 
Survey evidence suggests that members’ understanding of pension products is limited, 
particularly in relation to contribution details and projected pension entitlements. In the U.S., 
workers are not well informed about details of their pension plan (Mitchell, 1988) or their 
expected pension benefits (Bernheim, 1988; Gustman and Steinmeier , 2005). This latter 
study reported that many workers in DC schemes did not realise their employer contributed to 
the pension, with just a small minority knowing that the employee’s pay determined 
employer contributions. Dvorak and Hanley (2010) recorded a somewhat higher level of 
understanding of DC plans, though the authors note that survey selection bias and the sample 
pool (employees of a small liberal arts college) may have led them to overestimate 
understanding relative to the broader population. Using longitudinal data, Dushi and Honig 
(2015) reported better knowledge about inclusion in a DC scheme among the more recent 
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cohort. However, conditional on inclusion, members of this cohort displayed no better 
knowledge than previous cohorts about the size of contributions and were equally inclined to 
systematic overestimation. 
 
Among a sample of older English people, Crawford and Tetlow (2012) found that over half 
those aged 50 to 64 who were not retired could not report the exact amount they expected to 
get at retirement. A majority had never thought about how many years of retirement they 
might need to finance. Similarly, Barrett et al. (2015) reported that two-thirds of pension 
scheme members aged 50 and over in Ireland did not know what their payment in retirement 
would be or the form it would take. Accuracy of beliefs about retirement benefits improves 
with age (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2005; Bottazzi et al, 2006; Guiso et al, 2013), suggesting 
that results for these older samples probably represent upper bounds of knowledge in the 
wider population.  
 
2.2  Improving Understanding and Decision-Making: Experimental Evidence 
 
While there is some existing experimental evidence, to the best of our knowledge the present 
study is the first on simplifying pension disclosures to combine an explicit measure of 
comprehension with a decision task. In other financial domains, studies of simplified 
disclosures have produced mixed results. Lacko and Pappalardo (2010) tested a simplified 
mortgage disclosure form and showed that it improved understanding of the costs and terms 
of loans. By contrast, Beshears et al. (2011) found that a simplified Summary Prospectus did 
not improve decision-making in relation to mutual funds, as measured by the extent to which 
incentivised participants avoided paying unnecessary fees.   
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There is some evidence that interventions designed to improve understanding can lead to 
higher participation in retirement savings plans. Duflo and Saez (2003) used relatively small 
incentives to encourage individuals to learn more about retirement savings vehicles and found 
that this intervention boosted participation. Bernheim and Garrett (2003) reported large 
impacts of the provision of financial education seminars in the workplace on individual 
savings behaviour. However, other studies report that positive knowledge effects of 
information campaigns about pensions can be quite short lived (Finseraas, Jakobsson and 
Svensson, 2017).  
 
Several interventions have focused on one of two specific aspects of pension schemes: the 
composition of contributions and the dynamics of fund growth. Duflo et al. (2006) used a 
large randomized field study to compare the effect of the U.S. government’s Saver’s Credit 
tax relief to an economically equivalent subsidy in the form of a simple and transparent 
matching contribution. The results showed a large positive effect of the ‘match’ presentation 
format on take-up and contribution rates compared to the more complex tax relief condition, 
implying a link between simplicity and willingness to make contributions. The complexity of 
tax incentives may partly explain why studies find them to be ineffective in in boosting 
retirement savings (Börsch-Supan, 2004; Ramnath, 2013; Pensions Policy Institute, 2013)  
 
With respect to fund growth, previous studies have emphasised systematic underestimation of 
compound interest, part of the broader phenomenon of “exponential growth bias” (EGB) 
(Wagenaar and Sagaria, 1975). Controlling for background characteristics, households with 
greater EGB borrow more and save less (Stango and Zinman, 2009). Goda et al. (2014) used 
a large field experiment to test two treatments in mailed information brochures designed to 
combat EGB. A “balance” treatment contained a projection of how additional contributions 
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would translate into assets at retirement. An “income” treatment added a customized 
projection of the additional annual income generated by these assets. The latter intervention 
was effective in increasing contributions relative to a control group, though multiple 
candidate mechanisms may have driven the increase.  
 
In summary, previous research suggests that learning about retirement savings and simplified, 
salient information disclosures may induce higher pension contributions. The mechanism 
involved is often assumed to be improved comprehension, though this is not generally tested 
by combining measures of comprehension with decision outcomes. In the present study, we 
explore this link via explicit measures of both understanding and decisions within the same 
context. 
 
2.3  Explanatory Diagrams 
 
We consulted educational psychology literature to see what tools, if any, improved 
comprehension of other complex topics. The use of explanatory diagrams often has a 
beneficial impact on learning compared to text based explanations (Mayer, 2002; Butcher, 
2006; McCrudden, 2007), giving credence to the folk wisdom that “a picture is worth a 
thousand words”. More specifically, these studies report that explanatory blocks of text often 
fail to impart understanding of causal relationships, while simple diagrams can assist causal 
inference. Although the mechanism is not fully understood, diagrams appear to be efficient in 
either unlocking additional cognitive capacity or simply eliminating the superfluous. 
Ainsworth (2006) posits that different representations of information lead learners to use 
different cognitive strategies. In a verbal protocol analysis, Cromley et. al. (2010) showed 
that high-level cognitive activities, such as inferences, were used more often when 
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comprehending diagrams than when reading text, albeit with the caveat that students often 
skipped diagrams. 
 
These findings on the effectiveness of diagrams in promoting causal inference suggest 
potential merit in exploring the use of diagrams for communicating information about 
pensions. Two specific inferences seem particularly relevant: (1) that an increase in the 
contribution from take-home pay leads to a (often substantially) larger increase in the overall 
contribution to the fund; (2) that an increase in contributions generates a proportionally 
greater increase in the projected pension fund. 
 
2.4  Hypotheses 
 
Given the findings reviewed above in relation to explanatory diagrams, we investigated 
whether diagrams might be exploited to help individuals to process information about 
pensions. The diagrams were designed specifically to assist in making the two inferences 
identified above. The following hypotheses were developed: 
 
H1: Explanatory diagrams will lead to better recall of information contained in the PBS, 
relative to conditions with no diagram. 
H2: Explanatory diagrams will improve comprehension of information contained in the PBS. 
H3: Explanatory diagrams will increase willingness to increase contributions to the pension. 
H4: Participants with better comprehension of the PBS contents will be more willing to 
increase contributions. 
H5: Explanatory diagrams will improve the coherence of the stated rationale for decisions in 
relation to altering contribution levels.   
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In addition, we investigated whether recall, comprehension or decision-making were affected 
by presenting information about costs charged to pension members (e.g., annual management 
changes) in a narrative or in a tabular format (similar to a bank statement). This manipulation 
was motivated by the regulator’s concerns that many individuals did not pay attention to or 
comprehend pension costs. As the literature does not address this issue, we had no prior 
hypothesis about the presence or direction of potential effects on recall, comprehension and 
decision-making. 
 
3.  Experiment 
 
We designed and conducted a laboratory experiment in which participants read a single PBS 
form and answered questions about its contents, with key aspects of the PBS manipulated 
between subjects. The experiment centred on a hypothetical scenario. Participants were asked 
to consider a request from a friend to read a PBS statement and to provide advice. Although 
the scenario was hypothetical, participants were incentivised, given time to read the PBS 
carefully, and knew that it would form the basis of their subsequent responses. We judge it 
likely that knowing this led our participants to pay at least as much, if not more attention to 
the PBS than a person typically would when an annual PBS arrived through the post. 
Furthermore, while acknowledging that participants’ responses might have been affected by 
the fact that the PBS information related to a third party, the comparison of responses 
between conditions is likely to be instructive as to how different formats of the PBS interact 
with cognitive mechanisms involved in judgement and decision-making. Where alternative 
PBS formats generate different patterns of responses, the implication is that formats engage 
cognitive mechanisms in systematic ways, with consequent relevance for real world contexts. 
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The experiment followed a 2 x 2 x 2, orthogonal, between-subjects design. The three 
manipulations were the presence of a diagram (versus a table) designed to illustrate 
contributions, the presence of a diagram (versus a table) designed to illustrate projected 
pension income, and the presence of a table (versus text) designed to inform about costs. The 
orthogonal design ensured that both sides of each manipulation were encountered by half the 
experimental sample and the eight possible combinations of the three manipulations were 
each encountered by one eighth of the sample.    
 
3. 1 Method 
 
3.1.1 Participants 
 
Participants were a representative sample of 176 Dublin-based consumers aged 22-60 
(mean=37.5), balanced across gender (85 Male, 91 Female), educational attainment (104 with 
a primary degree) 2 and working status (144 working), recruited by a market research 
company. Each was paid a guaranteed €30 for participation in the present experiment and an 
unrelated study. Performance in the experiment was incentivised via a lottery in which 
participants could win a €50 shopping voucher. Additional lottery tickets were earned for 
correct responses (to each question with an objectively correct answer). One in ten 
participants stood to win a voucher  and participants were aware of this chance of winning. 
The experiment conformed to institutional ethical procedures. The session lasted 
approximately one hour. 
 
                                                 
2 The Dublin population has a high level of educational attainment by international standards, with the majority 
of working age people educated to degree level. Thirty-eight of the sample also had a postgraduate qualification 
and another 20 a diploma. 
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3.1.2. PBS Forms 
 
The PBS forms were based on the existing templates provided by Ireland’s pensions 
regulator. They were three pages long and comprised eight sections. The experimental 
manipulations centred on Sections 4, 5 and 7.  
 
Section 1 gave eight pieces of information: name, age, marital status, pensionable salary, 
membership number, retirement age, retirement date, years to retirement. Membership 
number and retirement age (68) were held constant across all forms. The other information 
varied. Half the forms had female names, the other half male. On half the forms the pension 
member was married, on the other half single. The age of the pension member varied from 
23-54. Salaries were selected pseudorandomly from a range beginning at €22,425 and 
increasing in increments of €125 up to the high-rate tax cut-off of €33,300, then in 
increments of €475 up to a maximum of €75,100. Thus, half the forms described members 
taxed at Ireland’s standard 20% rate, the other 88 at the higher 40% marginal rate. A 
moderate correlation was imposed between age and salary. The 176 different salaries were 
assigned to equivalise the mean salary across the eight PBS types. 
 
Section 2 was titled ‘How much have I built up so far?’ and detailed the balance in the 
retirement savings account at the start and end of the year. The starting balance ranged from 
€10,590 to €110,590, with a moderate positive correlation between starting fund size and 
salary.  
 
Section 3, ‘How much might I get when I retire?’, displayed two projections for fund size at 
retirement and the pension that fund size might buy, one based on an “expected” scenario and 
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the other on an “unfavourable” scenario. These projections used the assumptions laid out by 
the regulator in its online pension calculator. 
 
Section 4 presented the breakdown of contributions. Half the participants saw the standard 
contributions table (Appendix A, Figure A1, top). Underneath was a brief explanation of how 
tax relief works. The other 88 participants saw our contributions diagram (Appendix A, 
Figure A1, bottom). Stacks of Euro coins represented each element, with arrows and symbols 
indicating relations between them. There was no text description of how tax relief works. 
 
Section 5 was titled ‘Charges and Investment Return’. Half the participants received a tabular 
version (Appendix A, Figure A2, top), the other half a narrative version containing the same 
information in a short paragraph of text (Appendix A, Figure A2, bottom). 
 
Section 6 detailed how the pension member’s details had changed since the previous year. On 
all forms the salary (and hence contribution) increased by 2.5%. 
 
Section 7, ‘Income Now for Income Later’ (hereafter INFIL), described how savings at 
retirement could be increased by contributing more now. Half the participants received a 
tabular version (Appendix A, Figure A3, top), with different columns showing alternative 
monthly contributions from take home pay, projected fund sizes at retirement and the 
commensurate pension. The columns compared the current contribution with increases from 
take home pay of 50% and 100%. The INFIL diagram shown to the other 88 participants was 
based on the same figures, but the projections were placed inside cartoon pots of money of 
increasing size (Appendix A, Figure A3, bottom). 
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Section 8, ‘How do I find out more?’, provided additional information available from the 
pension provider. This standard section was identical on all forms and did not contain 
information relevant to the experiment.  
 
3.1.3 Questionnaire 
 
Responses were obtained via a computerised questionnaire programmed in Python using the 
PsychoPy package (Peirce, 2007; 2009) and presented on individual 14” laptops. The 
questionnaire consisted of four stages. The first was conducted after participants initially read 
the PBS and placed it back in its envelope. The PBS was taken back out again for the 
remaining sections (see Procedure).  
 
Stage 1 involved eight multiple-choice questions (MCQs) that tested recall. Two questions 
were related to each of the three main manipulations, while the remaining two were control 
questions. The specific questions are provided in Appendix A (Table A1); Figure A4 shows a 
screenshot. The position of the correct answer was randomised. For numeric questions, 
incorrect answers were pseudo-randomised to be 10%, 15% and 25% larger or smaller than 
the correct answer, such that the correct response was equally likely to be the largest, second 
largest, second smallest or smallest answer. After completing the eight questions, participants 
judged confidence in their answers on a scale of 1-7. 
 
Stage 2 comprised eight MCQs that probed comprehension. Again, two questions targeted 
each manipulation. The questions are provided in Appendix A (Table A2); Figure A5 shows 
a screenshot. Incorrect answers were pseudo-randomised as in Stage 1. For questions not 
based on specific figures in the participant’s PBS (Q2.1, Q2.2 and Q2.8) some incorrect 
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answers were designed to be intuitively appealing as an answer. After completing the 
questions participants again rated their confidence. 
 
Stage 3 asked for advice based on the PBS form. They were instructed: “In Stage 3 your 
friend is going to ask you for some advice. There are no right or wrong answers, but please 
try to give the advice you would genuinely give to a friend of yours”. They were then asked: 
“Your friend wants to know whether you think they should change their contribution. What 
do you think they should do?” The following responses were offered: “don’t change it”, 
“decrease it a little”, “increase it a little”, “decrease it a lot”, “increase it a lot”, “I wouldn’t 
feel comfortable giving a friend pension advice”. If the last option was selected, a screen 
appeared with the following text: “Your friend understands you don’t feel comfortable giving 
pension advice, but they are insisting you at least give them your best guess. What option 
would you go for?”. Participants could choose: “increase pension contribution”, “decrease 
pension contribution” and “don’t change pension contribution”. Participants were then asked: 
“What are your reasons for giving this advice?” and prompted to type an answer of up to 50 
words. Lastly, they again rated confidence in their decisions. 
 
Stage 4 collected information on the participant’s own pension situation and background. 
This included whether they had a private pension and, if so, whether it was a defined benefit 
or defined contribution pension. They rated their knowledge of their pension and whether 
they were intending to alter contributions. Participants also provided their gender, age and 
highest level of educational attainment. Questions are provided in Appendix A (Table A3). 
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3.1.4 Procedure 
 
Participants arrived to the laboratory in groups of ten. PBS forms were randomly assigned 
and placed in an opaque envelope beside each laptop. Participants read and signed a consent 
form before attention was directed to the envelopes. The experimenter explained that 
participants were “to imagine you are at a friend’s house and your friend has received this 
envelope in the post, and they would like you to look at it for them”. They were told the 
contents would form the basis for the following stages of the experiment. Participants had 
been informed in the consent sheet that there were performance-based financial incentives. 
Participants were asked to read the PBS carefully for four minutes, after which they returned 
the form to the envelope.  
 
The experimenter then explained that onscreen instructions would guide them through four 
stages, but stressed that the first two stages involved MCQs, some of which may be quite 
difficult. The lottery incentive structure was described: “Before we start I want to remind you 
that one-in-ten of our participants will win a €50 [brand name] voucher for taking part in 
today’s experiment. We are going to hold a raffle for these vouchers and everyone’s name 
will go in at least once. But for each MCQ question you get correct, your name will go into 
the raffle for a €50 voucher an extra time. So please try your best as it will increase your 
chances of winning a voucher.” This incentive structure meant that even participants who felt 
they were unlikely to fare well relative to others still improved their chances with every good 
answer.  
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Participants proceeded at their own pace. Before Stage 2 an onscreen instruction told them to 
remove the PBS from the envelope again and use it to answer the questions. On finishing 
Stage 4, the questionnaire ended and participants were thanked. 
 
3. 2 Results 
 
3.2.1  Recall Questions 
 
The number of correct responses in Stage 1 was approximately normally distributed across 
the 176 participants (mean = 4.43, sd = 1.57). Performance by question and format is shown 
in Table 1. Binomial tests of proportion were used to test whether diagrams improved recall. 
H1 is directional, so the appropriate test is one-tailed for comparisons between diagrams and 
tables. For the costs questions, tests were two-tailed. For Question 1.2, which asked 
participants to recall the total annual pension contribution, those who saw the contributions 
diagram were more likely to respond correctly (p<0.05 ). All other differences were non-
significant. Although participants were randomly assigned, logistic regressions were 
estimated to ensure the results were robust to controlling for background characteristics. 
Separate models were estimated for correct/incorrect responses to each question, with 
condition, gender, age, educational attainment and whether the participant had a pension 
specified as control variables. The pattern of statistical significance was as in Table 1. The 
total number of correct answers was almost identical between conditions with and without the 
relevant diagram.  
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Table 1: Number of Correct Responses by Question for Stage 1 Recall and Stage 2 
Comprehension. Percentage Correct reported in Parentheses. 
 Diagram Table Control 
 Yes No Yes No  
Recall      
Q1.1 29 (33%) 36 (41%) - - - 
Q1.2 64 (73%)** 54 (61%) - - - 
Q1.4 51 (58%) 54 (61%) - - - 
Q1.5 43 (49%) 46 (52%) - - - 
Q1.7 - - 46 (52%) 50 (57%) - 
Q1.8 - - 35 (40%) 45 (51%) - 
Q1.3 - - - - 131 (74%) 
Q1.6 - - - - 98 (56%) 
Total 187 (53%)  190 (54%) 81 (46%) 95 (54%) 229 (65%) 
Comprehension      
Q2.1 12 (14%) 14 (16%) - - - 
Q2.2 19 (22%) 14 (16%) - - - 
Q2.4 48 (55%) 49 (56%) - - - 
Q2.5 44 (50%)* 35 (40%) - - - 
Q2.7 - - 64 (73%) 65 (74%) - 
Q2.8 - - 49 (56%) 52 (59%) - 
Q2.3 - - - - 123 (70%) 
Q2.6 - - - - 128 (73%) 
 
 123 (35%) 112 (32%) 115 (65%) 117 (66%) 251 (71%) 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05;  *** p<0.01 
 
 
3.2.2  Comprehension Questions 
 
The number of correct responses in Stage 2 was approximately normally distributed (mean = 
4.07, sd = 1.60). Table 1 (bottom) shows correct responses by question and format. 
Participants shown the relevant diagram were marginally (p < 0.1) more likely to respond 
correctly to Question 2.5, which asked about the effect on the projected monthly pension of 
doubling contributions from take home pay. This pattern was again confirmed in logistic 
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regressions specified as described in subsection 3.2.1. The proportions of correct answers to 
the comprehension questions on contributions (Questions 2.1 and 2.2) were substantially 
lower than for the other questions. The total number of correct answers was closely similar by 
condition. Across all eight (recall and comprehension) relevant questions, performance was 
better without the diagram for five and better with the diagram for three.  
 
3.2.3  Advice by Format 
 
In Stage 3, the majority of participants (125) proposed that contributions should be increased, 
most (106) by “a little”. Table 2 reports odds ratios from a series of logistic regressions where 
the dependent variable is whether the participant proposed increased contributions. As 
previously, the diagrams are subject to one-tailed tests. Model (1) includes only the PBS 
formats as independent variables. Participants who saw the INFIL diagram were significantly 
more likely to recommend an increase. The estimated effect remains strong and is highly 
significant after control variables are added in Model (2), giving an odds ratio of 2.62. The 
contributions diagram and tabular costs had no significant effect. Model (3) introduces a 
variable for the number of correct answers to comprehension questions in Stage 2, which is 
positive and highly significant. The point estimate implies an odds ratio of 1.35 for each 
additional correct question. The introduction of this variable has no impact on the estimated 
odds ratio for the INFIL diagram. When control variables are added in Model (4) the 
comprehension variable becomes non-significant, while the INFIL diagram remains highly 
significant. 
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Table 2: Logistic regressions for whether participant advised an increase in 
contributions. Output is given as odds ratios. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     Contributions diagram .945 
(.319) 
1.04 
(.373) 
.841 
(.293) 
.945 
(.348) 
INFIL diagram 1.86** 
(.635) 
2.62*** 
(.986) 
1.87** 
(.653) 
2.54*** 
(.962) 
Tabular costs 1.67 
(.566) 
1.39 
(.508) 
1.56 
(.541) 
1.39 
(.515) 
Male 
 
1.20 
(.433)  
1.16 
(.420) 
Over 35 
 
.671 
(.254)  
.771 
(.304) 
Degree 
 
3.29*** 
(1.24)  
3.10*** 
(1.18) 
Pension holder 
 
1.94* 
(.737)  
1.61 
(.651) 
Comprehension score 
(Stage 2)   
1.35*** 
(.149) 
1.18 
(.147) 
     Constant 1.48 
(.477) 
.578 
(.293) 
.578 
(.293) 
.578 
(.293) 
     
Obs. 176 176 176 176 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
3.2.4 Rationale for Advice by Format 
 
The reasons participants gave for their advice were coded independently by two researchers 
according to the protocol outlined in Appendix B. Both researchers were blind to the PBS 
formats of the participants. The intention of this coding was to act as a proxy variable for the 
making of the two key inferences that were highlighted in Section 2 and formed the basis for 
the diagrams. Two of the categories related to the composition of contributions: category (a), 
whether participants mentioned the employer matching contribution; and category (b), 
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whether they mentioned tax relief. Similarly, two of the categories related to projections of 
pension income: category (c), whether participants mentioned increasing returns from 
contributing to the pension; and category (d), whether they mentioned the current projected 
pension being insufficient for retirement. Table 3 presents logistic regression models where 
the dependent variable is whether a “contributions” (category a or b) or “projections” 
(category c or d) rationale was given. Models (1) and (2) confirm that those who saw the 
contributions diagram were significantly more likely to produce a rationale for their advice 
based on tax relief or the employer match. Models (3) and (4) confirm that those who saw the 
INFIL diagram were significantly more likely to produce a rationale for their advice based on 
projected pension income or increasing returns. The contributions diagram and the tabular 
costs also generated increases in the likelihood of providing a “projections” rationale, albeit 
that these estimated effects were smaller than the effect of the INFIL diagram.  
 
 3.2.5 Individual Differences 
 
Across the various outcome variables of interest there were statistically significant effects of 
background characteristics. Most notably, those with a degree were substantially more likely 
to propose an increase in contributions (Table 2) and to give one of the two rationales related 
to the two inferences of interest (Table 3). Any effects associated with having a pension were 
positive but only marginally significant. An OLS regression of the total number of correct 
recall answers in Stage 1 on format and available background characteristics revealed no 
significant effects of background characteristics on recall except for marginally better 
performance among men (β=.403, z=1.69, p<0.1). A similar analysis of the number of correct 
comprehension answers in Stage 2 found that participants aged under 35 years produced 
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significantly more correct answers (β=.777, z=3.41, p<0.01), as did those with a degree 
(β=.499, z=2.16, p<0.05) and those who had a pension (β=1.08, z=4.73, p<0.001). 
Table 3: Logistic regressions for whether participant’s rationale for advice was based 
on the composition of contributions (Models 1 and 2) or whether the rationale was 
based on projections of pension income (Models 3 and 4). Output is given as odds ratios. 
 Contributions rationale Projections rationale 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     Contributions diagram 2.94* 
(1.87) 
3.71** 
(2.45) 
2.99* 
(1.76) 
3.06* 
(1.83) 
INFIL diagram 1.28 
(.91) 
1.71 
(1.25) 
3.35** 
(1.96) 
3.80** 
(2.27) 
Contributions and 
INFIL diagrams 1.89 (1.26) 
2.88 
(2.03) 
2.65 
(1.57) 
3.01 
(1.84) 
Tabular costs 1.00 
(.43) 
.83 
(.385) 
2.08** 
(.78) 
1.90* 
(.74) 
Male 
 
1.04 
(.469)  
1.32 
(.497) 
Over 35 
 
1.03 
(.494)  
.76 
(.299) 
Degree 
 
3.28** 
(1.79)  
2.03* 
(.83) 
Pension holder 
 
2.47* 
(1.22)  
.892 
(.349) 
     Constant .1*** 
(.057) 
.021*** 
(.019) 
.084*** 
(.045) 
.056*** 
(.039) 
     
Obs. 176 176 176 176 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
3.3. Discussion 
 
The results provide insufficient evidence to support H1 and H2: the two diagrams did not 
improve recall or comprehension in a systematic way. Participants who saw the contributions 
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diagram were significantly more likely to recall the total contributions from a single reading 
of the PBS. Participants who saw the INFIL diagram were more likely to correctly determine 
the impact on projected income of doubling contributions, although this effect was only 
marginally statistically significant. Overall, however, there was not a consistent, clear 
advantage associated with the diagrams, with no overall effect on the total of correct answers.  
 
Regarding comprehension of contributions (questions Q2.1 and Q2.2), the low level of 
correct responses means that it is possible that the comparison between conditions was 
subject to a floor effect. Participants found these questions harder than anticipated based on 
piloting; perhaps too hard for variation between the diagram and non-diagram conditions to 
emerge. However, the two questions used round numbers designed to minimise arithmetic 
difficulty and centred on the relationships that matter for understanding incentives to 
contribute. Arguably, therefore, employing easier questions might not have generated any 
meaningful result even if variation between conditions had been observed. The more pressing 
concern is that even when the description was made as simple and clear as the experimenters 
could manage these two substantial subsidies from the employer and the government were 
beyond the grasp of a sample more than half of which possessed a primary degree. 
 
H3 was partially supported. Participants who saw the INFIL diagram were more likely to 
propose an increase in contributions, but there was no equivalent effect for the contributions 
diagram. H4 was supported. The higher the comprehension score in Stage 2, the more likely 
participants were to propose an increase in contributions. However, this effect became non-
significant and approximately halved in magnitude once educational attainment was 
controlled for (Table 2, Model 4). Thus, it is not clear whether the impact of better 
comprehension on advice was driven by the better comprehension itself, or whether 
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education to degree level both improves comprehension and increases the propensity to 
increase contributions via some other mechanism.    
  
H5 was also strongly supported by the present results. Participants who saw diagrams were 
more likely to employ arguments associated with those diagrams to explain their decision-
making. This effect was largely specific to the diagram concerned: participants who saw the 
contributions diagram were more likely to cite tax relief or matching contributions as a reason 
for their advice, while those who saw the INFIL diagram were more likely to cite reasons 
associated with projected income or investment returns. The suggestion is that the diagrams 
promoted the causal connections that they were designed to highlight, perhaps resulting in 
participants viewing the connection as more important, even though they did not improve 
answers to explicit comprehension questions. 
   
The contributions diagram and tabular costs manipulation both contributed to the likelihood 
that participants gave a rationale for their advice based on projected income or returns. While 
we cannot be sure of the reason for this, one possibility is that both manipulations reduced the 
amount of text on the PBS form and, in this sense, amounted to simplifications of the form as 
a whole. This may have increased the probability that participants located, paid attention to, 
or otherwise placed greater weight on the currently projected pension income, which 
appeared in two places on the form. With the exception of this (in any case marginal) effect, 
the comparison between the text and tabular provision of information about costs and fees 
was not significant. Responses to the relevant comprehension questions indicate that a 
substantial minority of participants were unable to understand how the balance between costs 
and returns on the investment determined growth in the overall fund.  
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The findings that participants displayed better comprehension of the key relationships if they 
were younger, more educated or already had a pension, are broadly in line with previous 
work (Lusardi, 2008). Having a degree also increased the likelihood of advising an increase 
in contributions. Naturally it is difficult to infer the direction of the various potential causal 
relationships, but they do confirm substantial and important individual differences.    
 
4. General Discussion 
 
The results of the present study suggest that there may be benefits to the use of explanatory 
diagrams in a Pension Benefit Statement (PBS) and other communications materials directed 
at pension scheme members and potential members. The ‘Income Now for Income Later’ 
(INFIL) diagram increased the likelihood of proposing an increase in contributions. The 
effect size was quite substantial, generating odds ratios of 1.9-2.6. Both diagrams supported 
decision-making in that they contributed to the reasons participants gave for contribution 
decisions. The implication is that the diagrams led participants to pay more attention or 
otherwise increase the weight given to tax relief and matching contributions, as well as to 
projected income, such that they were more likely to make inferences on the basis of these 
factors.  
 
Had these findings been accompanied by a clear and consistent improvement in recall and 
comprehension, the case that these inferences were good inferences, and hence that the 
diagrams tested improved decision-making, would be strong. That they did not invites further 
consideration. As outlined in the Section 2.3, diagrams can reinforce perceptions of causal 
relationships (Butcher, 2006), the idea that one thing leads to another, without necessarily 
improving understanding of exactly how such causal relationships operate. Thus, the present 
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results suggest that the introduction of such diagrams on the annual PBS may influence 
decision-making by leading decision-makers to make inferences about factors that they do 
not necessarily fully comprehend. From one perspective this might be considered 
problematic. On the other hand, the evidence supplied here shows that the direction of this 
influence leads decision-makers, on average, to support increased contributions to retirement 
saving, moving them into closer alignment with those decisions-makers who have higher 
educational attainment and score more highly on objective tests of comprehension.               
 
The results of the present study raise concerns about the operation of tax relief and matching 
contributions as incentives for increasing people’s willingness to contribute to their pension. 
A representative sample of participants, who were incentivised to respond accurately and 
most of whom had degrees, produced responses to multiple-choice questions about how these 
incentives work that were essentially no better than chance. This was despite the fact that the 
questions used simple round numbers and the participants had either a printed explanation or 
a diagram before them that was designed to assist. Moreover, the higher rate of successful 
responses to other questions, especially the control questions, indicates that participants were 
trying hard to answer correctly. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the composition of 
pension contributions is too complex for the general population to understand. It is possible 
that this lack of understanding partly explains why participants who saw the contributions 
diagram were more likely to cite tax relief or matching contributions as a rationale for their 
proposed contribution level, yet did not respond to these incentives by advising an increase. 
Thus, the present study might be considered supporting evidence for efforts to simplify 
incentives designed to encourage saving for retirement (Ranmath, 2013; Duflo et al, 2006). 
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As with all laboratory experiments, some caution is required in generalising and interpreting 
the results. Firstly, the present study may have underestimated the effect of providing 
diagrams, because the experimental design excluded the possibility that seeing that the 
document contained helpful diagrams might have led more people to pay attention to it in the 
first place. Participants had volunteered for the study and were incentivised to spend four 
minutes scrutinising the document, regardless of which version they received, and this is 
what experimenters observed during the sessions. Secondly, as explained in Section 3, the 
decisions made during the study were hypothetical. The majority of the experimental sample 
advised an increase in contributions, including those who did not themselves have a pension, 
echoing a possible disjunction between attitudes and behaviour, or perhaps intention and 
action. Yet these responses of our participants match survey evidence, which records that 
most people believe that they should increase their savings for retirement (Farkas and 
Johnson, 1997; Bernheim et al, 1995). It is also important to bear in mind that the primary 
findings consist of variation in responses across conditions, not absolute willingness or ability 
to act.   
 
The present study focuses on the understanding and decision-making only of individuals and 
at no stage considers the potential response of providers to the voluntary or mandatory 
introduction of explanatory diagrams into PBSs. Mandating the presentation of diagrams 
would impose a regulatory burden that would have to be considered against any estimate of 
the benefits they might bring. These benefits might be increased, however, if the specific 
diagrams developed for the present experiment were to be improved upon through experience 
and testing, perhaps undertaken by pension providers.  
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The relevance of the present findings arguably extends beyond contribution decisions made 
by those already in a pension. Diagrams may improve communications targeted at the 
primary decision of whether or not to take out a pension. More broadly, diagrams might be 
beneficial for communications that try to demystify other financial products and in a range of 
policy areas where information disclosure is used as a regulatory tool to support individual 
decision-making. Overall, although the diagrams we tested did not deliver a step-jump in 
understanding of pensions, the evidence supplied here suggests that there they may generate 
some benefits for decision-makers. The study also provides further evidence that people’s 
ability to comprehend pensions, as they are currently designed and described, requires 
attention from both economic researchers and policymakers.  
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Appendix A 
Figure A1: Contributions Table (top) and Diagram (bottom) 
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Figure A2: Costs Table (top) and Narrative (bottom) 
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Figure A3: INFIL Table (top) and Diagram (bottom) 
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Table A1: MCQs in Stage 1 
No. Manipulation Question 
   
Q1.1 Contributions Who contributes most to the pension contribution? 
Q1.2 Contributions What is the total annual pension contribution? 
Q1.3 Control What is your friend’s pensionable salary? 
Q1.4 INFIL What is your friend’s current monthly contribution from take home 
pay? 
Q1.5 INFIL If your friend’s pension contribution were to increase to [middle 
column amount] per month, what would their projected monthly 
pension be? 
Q1.6 Control What is your friend’s current projected monthly pension in the ‘best 
guess’ scenario? 
Q1.7 Costs What are the total costs charged on your friend’s retirement savings? 
Q1.8 Costs What is the return on investment on your friend’s retirement savings? 
 
Figure A4: Example screenshot of Stage 1 Question 
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Table A2: MCQs in Stage 2 
No. Manipulation Question 
   
Q2.1 Contributions By how much would the total annual pension contribution increase if 
your friend were to contribute an extra €120 from their take home pay 
annually? 
Q2.2 Contributions If the annual contribution from gross salary were to decrease by €200, 
how much would the total annual pension contribution decrease by? 
Q2.3 Control By how much did your friend’s salary change since their last 
statement? 
Q2.4 INFIL If you had to guess, approximately how large do you think your 
friend’s monthly pension would be if they contributed €112 per month 
from take home pay? 
Q2.5 INFIL If monthly contributions from take home pay doubled, what would the 
projected monthly pension be? 
Q2.6 Control By how much did your friend’s total annual contribution change since 
their last statement? 
Q2.7 Costs If the retirement fund grows at the same rate next year as this year, 
how will the charge in Euros for managing investments change? 
Q2.8 Costs The return on investment shows the fund grew by approximately what 
percentage between the start and end of the year? 
 
Figure A5: Example screenshot of Stage 2 question 
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Table A3: Questions in Stage 4 
No. Question 
  
Q4.1 Do you have a private pension or one provided through your 
employer: 
Q4.2 Is it defined benefits or defined contributions? 
Q4.3 On a scale of 1-7, how well do you know the specifics of your pension 
situation: 1 = not at all, 4 = some idea, 7 = extremely well 
Q4.4a (Asked if Q4.1 = YES) On a scale of 1-7, how likely are you to 
change your own pension contribution in the next 12 months? 
Q4.4b (Asked if Q4.1 = NO) On a scale of 1-7, how likely are you to look 
into starting a pension in the next 12 months? 
Q4.5 (Asked if Q4.1 = YES & Q4.4a >= 4) Are you thinking of increasing 
or decreasing your contribution level? 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B1: Categories for Coding Reasons given in Stage 3 (Advice) 
Category Inclusion Criteria 
  (a) Match Phrase mentioned employer matching contribution or similar wording 
with same meaning 
(b) Tax Phrase mentioning tax, tax relief or tax credits 
(c) Increasing 
Returns 
Phrase indicating that a small increase today in contributions leads to a 
larger proportional increase in the pension. 
(d) Insufficient Phrase mentioning that current projected pension would not be sufficient 
to live on, or similar phrasing to this effect. 
(e) Salary Increase If they mention salary increase from last year 
(f) Affordability Phrase indicating that they believe the friend can afford the proposed 
contribution change 
(g) Age If they mention friend’s age or how many years till retirement 
(h) Return On 
Investment 
If they mention phrase ‘return to investment’ This overlaps somewhat 
with Increasing Returns but it is more focused on annual return than 
relationship between contribution level and finial pension size. 
(i) Saving is Good Generic phrase about benefits of saving without giving a precise reason 
of  why it’s a good idea 
  
 
 
 
 
Year Number Title/Author(s) 
2017   
 587 Productivity spillovers from multinational activity to 
indigenous firms in Ireland 
Mattia Di Ubaldo, Martina Lawless and Iulia 
Siedschlag 
 586 Do consumers understand PCP car finance? An 
experimental investigation 
Terry McElvaney, Pete Lunn, Féidhlim McGowan 
 585 Analysing long-term interactions between demand 
response and different electricity markets using a 
stochastic market equilibrium model 
Valentin Bertsch , Mel Devine , Conor Sweeney , 
Andrew C. Parnell 
 584 Old firms and new products: Does experience 
increase survival? 
Martina Lawless and Zuzanna Studnicka 
 583 Drivers of people's preferences for spatial proximity 
to energy infrastructure technologies: a cross-country 
analysis 
Jason Harold, Valentin Bertsch, Thomas Lawrence and 
Magie Hall 
 582 Credit conditions and tenure choice: A cross-country 
examination 
David Cronin and Kieran McQuinn 
 581 The cyclicality of Irish fiscal policy ex-ante and ex-post 
David Cronin and Kieran McQuinn 
 580 Determinants of power spreads in electricity futures 
markets: A multinational analysis 
Petr Spodniak and Valentin Bertsch 
 579 Gifts and inheritances in Ireland 
Martina Lawless and Donal Lynch 
 578 Anglers' views on stock conservation: Sea Bass 
angling 
in Ireland 
Gianluca Grilli, John Curtis, Stephen Hynes and Paul 
O’Reilly 
 577 The effect of Demand Response and wind generation 
on electricity investment and operation 
Sheila Nolan, Mel Devine, Muireann Á. Lynch and 
Mark O’Malley 
 576 Determinants of residential heating system choice: an 
analysis of Irish households  
John Curtis, Daire McCoy, Claudia Novielli 
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